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Introduction 
The question of what drives strategic action has oc-
cupied a central position in the strategic management 
literature. Although several explanations of strate-
gic action have been developed, two views have been 
particularly dominant—industry structure and mana-
gerial cognition. The industry structure view assumes 
complete rationality on the part of strategic decision 
makers and contends that industry structure influ-
ences the timing and effectiveness of strategic actions 
(Bain, 1956; Caves, Fortunato, and Ghemawat, 1984; 
Ghemawat, 1991; Mason, 1957; Porter, 1985). In con-
trast, the managerial cognition literature suggests that 
bounded rationality prevents top managers from de-
veloping a complete understanding of their environ-
ments (Bogner and Barr, 2000; Daft and Weick, 1984; 
Fiol and O’Connor, 2003). Instead, top managers de-
velop subjective representations of the environment 
that, in turn, drive their strategic decisions and sub-
sequent firm action. The two camps have progressed 
along independent lines; industry structure has fo-
cused on cross-industry differences in strategic ac-
tions, downplaying the role of cognition, whereas the 
managerial cognition view has focused on the role of 
cognition in determining strategic actions within a 
single industry, giving little attention to the nature of 
that industry. Because each camp focuses on distinct 
explanations of strategic actions, we believe that a 
disconnect between the two views has created artifi-
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Abstract
This study addresses an apparent disconnect between two views of strategic action: the “economic view,” 
which contends that industry structure is the primary influence on strategic action, and the “cognitive view,” 
which suggests that managerial cognition drives strategic action. We argue that this disconnect has created ar-
tificial boundaries between the two perspectives and has limited our ability to develop holistic explanations of 
strategic action. In response, we develop an integrated model that answers two questions: 1) Does industry con-
text affect managerial cognition? 2) Does managerial cognition mediate the relationship between industry con-
text and strategic responses to environmental changes? To examine these questions, we study the relationship 
between industry velocity, the structure of top management’s cognitive representation of the environment, and 
the speed of response to environmental events. We find that industry velocity influences the structure of cogni-
tive representations, which in turn influence the speed of response to environmental events. These results sup-
port our contention that both industry and cognition variables are critical in developing explanations of strate-
gic actions. These results have implications for our understanding of the development of top managers’ beliefs, 
the relationship between beliefs and action, and the nature of the complex relationship between industry con-
text, managerial cognition, and strategic action. 
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cial boundaries between industry structure and man-
agerial cognition as drivers of strategic action. These 
boundaries have, in turn, severely inhibited the de-
velopment of comprehensive and integrated explana-
tions of strategic action. 
Recent studies have suggested that an integration 
of the industry structure and managerial cognition 
views may lead to a better and more complete ex-
planation of strategic action (Johnson and Hoopes, 
2003). For example, while cognitive boundedness 
prohibits the perfect rationality suggested by the in-
dustry structure view (Simon, 1991), the exogenous 
economic characteristics of industries do exist inde-
pendently of managers’ beliefs about them and “can 
force industry members to accept a reality that they 
might not have enacted on their own” (Johnson and 
Hoopes, 2003: 1,057). This suggests that a relation-
ship between industry structure and managerial 
cognition may exist and may explain strategic action 
better than either perspective can on its own. Fur-
ther, this connection brings to the foreground an as-
sumption often implied, but not tested, in the cog-
nition literature: that industry influences facets of 
managerial cognition, which affects how managers 
make sense of and act within their environments. 
If this is true, then it suggests that cognition medi-
ates the relationship between industry context and 
strategic action. To investigate this possibility, this 
study addresses two questions: 
● Does industry context affect managerial cognition 
about environments? 
● Does managerial cognition mediate the relationship 
between industry context and strategic action? 
We address these questions by focusing on top 
managers’ subjective representations of their firms’ 
operating environments. Both the strategic choice 
(Child, 1972) and upper echelon views (Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984) argue that top managers bring to-
gether and interpret information for the firm as a 
whole. Many may participate in scanning or data 
processing, but the point at which information con-
verges and is interpreted for organizational-level 
action is presumed to be at the top manager level 
(Daft and Weick, 1984; Lyles and Schwenk, 1992; 
Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; Thomas, Clark, and Gioia, 
1993). How top managers construct their environ-
ments has been argued to both influence which en-
vironmental events attract the attention of strategic 
decision makers and which events are selectively ig-
nored in strategic decision making, as well as the na-
ture of the response to environmental events (Bog-
ner and Barr, 2000; Daft and Weick, 1984; Fiol and 
O’Connor, 2003). In other words, subjective repre-
sentations that top managers develop about their 
environments help define the firm’s strategic agenda 
(Dutton and Jackson, 1987). 
We examine differences in two forms of sub-
jective representations that top managers develop 
about environments—attention focus (the aspects of 
the environment that are central to top managers’ 
subjective representations of their environments) 
and environment-strategy causal logics (the order of 
the perceived causal relationship between the ex-
ternal environment and firm strategy). Attention 
focus about the environment is important because 
it influences the degree of mindful attention that 
will be directed to a given environmental event 
(Weick, 1995) and influences the likelihood that 
any given environmental event will make it onto 
the firm’s strategic agenda (Cho and Hambrick, 
2006; Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Huff, 1990). Causal 
logics, on the other hand, are the primary basis for 
decision making in general (Fiske and Taylor, 1991) 
and have been found to influence the way in which 
strategic decisions are made, understood, and com-
municated (Huff, 1990). 
We examine attention focus and causal logics of 
top managers in two different industry contexts: 
high velocity (semiconductor and cosmetic indus-
tries) and low velocity (aircraft and petrochemical 
industries). We propose that industry velocity will 
influence attention focus and causal logics that, in 
turn, will influence the speed of strategic action re-
sponses to major environmental changes. In other 
words, attention focus and causal logics will medi-
ate the relationship between industry velocity and 
speed of strategic action responses to environmen-
tal changes. Our study provides unique insights on 
how the industry and cognitive views collectively 
explain strategic action. 
Theory Development and Hypotheses 
Overview of theoretical model 
We present our theoretical model in Figure 1. The 
central contention of our model is that attention fo-
cus and causal logics that top managers develop 
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will mediate the relationship between industry ve-
locity and strategic actions. We propose that as top 
managers make sense of, learn from, and address 
the unique cognitive challenges embedded in the 
velocity of their operating environments, they will 
develop specific attention focus and causal log-
ics about their environments. Further, drawing on 
the managerial cognition literature (Barr and Huff, 
1997; Bogner and Barr, 2000; Chakravarthy, 1982; 
Cho and Hambrick, 2006; Daft and Weick, 1984; 
Lant, Milliken, and Batra, 1992; Simon, 1991; Weick, 
1995), we propose that top managers’ attention fo-
cus and causal logics will act as a filter in determin-
ing how top managers notice and respond to major 
environmental changes in their operating environ-
ments. Firms will not respond to raw environmental 
changes unless they notice these variables and inter-
pret how these variables affect their firm. Thus, in-
dustry velocity will not affect strategic actions di-
rectly; rather attention focus and causal logics will 
mediate the relationship between industry velocity 
and strategic actions. 
Attention focus and causal logics 
The strategic choice and psychosocial views of or-
ganizations (Child, 1972; Weick, 1995) suggest that 
cognitive limits preclude top managers from devel-
oping a complete understanding of their environ-
ments (Bogner and Barr, 2000; Daft and Weick, 1984; 
Fiol and O’Connor, 2003). Instead, top managers de-
velop subjective representations of their environ-
ment that provide a lens through which they view 
the current events and activities and make strategic 
decisions. Thus it is these top managers’ subjective 
cognitive representations, and not the objective en-
vironments, that directly affect a firm’s strategic pri-
orities and drive decision making. We focus on two 
forms of subjective representations that top manag-
ers develop about their environment—attention focus 
and environment-strategy causal logics. 
Attention focus 
Attention focus refers to the degree to which top 
managers’ subjective representations of their exter-
nal environment are dominated by concepts related 
to one (or more) domain over others. Top managers 
are bombarded with a vast amount of strategic infor-
mation that often exceeds their cognitive capacity (Si-
mon, 1991). One way to deal with this cognitive over-
load is through the process of selective attention. Top 
managers focus their attention on those domains that 
they deem to be most relevant while selectively ignor-
ing others (Bogner and Barr, 2000; Daft and Weick, 
1984; Fiol and O’Connor, 2003; Hambrick and Mason, 
1984; Starbuck and Milliken, 1988). Attention focus is 
important because it provides a filter through which 
top managers identify issues. 
Despite its importance, attention focus remains 
under-researched. Most literature in this area is the-
oretical and highlights the impact of firm context 
(Cho and Hambrick, 2006; Ocasio, 1997) and past 
performance (March and Shapira, 1992) on the at-
tention focus of managers. For example, Ocasio 
(1997) theorized that firms’ communication and pro-
cedural channels (e.g., action memoranda, personnel 
evaluation, budgetary and capital appropriations re-
quests) affect the attention of decision makers. Cho 
and Hambrick (2006) examined the mediating ef-
fects of attention patterns in the relationship be-
tween top management characteristics and strategic 
change. In their simulation study, March and Sha-
pira (1992) found that firm resources and past per-
formance affect the attention focus of firms. The im-
pact of environment on attention focus has not been 
addressed in previous research, despite the fact that 
the relationship between strategy and external envi-
ronment is highlighted as a central feature in strat-
egy research. 
Figure 1. Theoretical model of industry velocity, mana-
gerial cognition, and speed of strategic responses 
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Attention focus can be directed toward the ex-
ternal environment (e.g., competition, regulations, 
macroeconomic factors, technology) or internal or-
ganizational context (e.g., organizational structures, 
resources, policies and procedures, communication 
channels). In this study, we examine attention fo-
cus directed toward the external environment. Top 
managers’ attention focus toward external environ-
ment is important because it influences the degree of 
mindful attention that will be directed to a given en-
vironmental event (Weick, 1995) and determines the 
likelihood that any given environmental event will 
make it onto the firm’s strategic agenda and will be 
responded to (Dutton and Jackson, 1987). 
The strategy literature has identified two sectors 
of environment to which firms attend—task and gen-
eral (Bourgeois, 1980; Daft, Sormunen, and Parks, 
1988; Garg, Walters, and Priem, 2003). The task sec-
tor includes those aspects of the environment that 
have direct transactions with the firm such as com-
petitors, suppliers, and customers, while the gen-
eral sector includes more macro-level dimensions 
such as social, demographic, economic, and polit-
ical. Previous studies show that top managers dif-
fer in their relative emphasis on each sector in stra-
tegic decision making (Bourgeois, 1980; Daft et al., 
1988), thereby highlighting the usefulness of this di-
chotomy for examining attention focus in subjective 
representations of the environment. Moreover, dif-
ferences in attention focus across these two sectors 
have been found to have implications for strategic 
action (Garg et al., 2003). 
Environment-strategy causal logics 
Causal reasoning is the primary basis for decision 
making in general (Fiske and Taylor, 1991) and has 
been found to influence the way in which strate-
gic decisions are made, understood, and commu-
nicated (Huff, 1990). Of particular importance to 
strategic decision making are top managers’ be-
liefs regarding the causal relationship between en-
vironment and strategy. In the course of decision 
making, top managers generate beliefs that relate 
various environmental and strategy concepts to-
gether in a causal manner. These cause-effect be-
liefs about the environment-strategy relationship 
frame specific strategic issues and affect how they 
are interpreted and what strategic actions are initi-
ated (Barr, Stimpert, and Huff, 1992; Barr and Huff, 
1997; Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan, 1983; Eden, 
Ackermann, and Cropper, 1992; Priem, 1994; Stub-
bart, 1989). In short, raw signals from the environ-
ment are not addressed until top managers inter-
pret their causal relationship with the firm (Huff, 
1990; Dutton et al., 1983). 
Daft and Weick (1984) differentiate between en-
vironment-driven and interpretation-driven cause-
effect beliefs about the environment. In environ-
ment-driven frames, top managers experience 
environments as concrete, hard, measurable, and 
determinant. They therefore first seek to identify en-
vironmental demands and then develop strategies 
in response to them. Top managers thus assume the 
environment to determine strategy. Such environ-
ment → strategy beliefs represent deterministic log-
ics (Fahey and Narayanan, 1989). On the other hand, 
top managers of firms confronting more unsta-
ble or unanalyzable environments are thought “to 
construct, coerce, or enact a reasonable interpreta-
tion that makes previous action sensible” (Daft and 
Weick, 1984: 287, emphasis added). Thus, they at-
tempt to construct their environments through their 
strategies rather than developing strategies in re-
sponse to environments (Lyles and Schwenk, 1992), 
resulting in strategy → environment beliefs, or pro-
active logics (Fahey and Narayanan, 1989). 
Industry velocity, attention focus, and causal logics 
Extant research contends that subjective cognitive 
representations that top managers develop about 
their environments are the result of making sense 
of, learning from, and addressing the unique cog-
nitive challenges embedded in their operating envi-
ronments (Daft and Weick, 1984; Fiske and Taylor, 
1991; Reger and Palmer, 1996; Osborne, Stubbart, 
and Ramaprasad, 2001). For example, Bogner and 
Barr (2000) argued that through the process of mak-
ing sense of and responding to the cognitive chal-
lenges embedded in the hypercompetitive environ-
ments, top managers in hypercompetitive industries 
develop cognitive representations that are signif-
icantly different from those held by top managers 
from firms operating in more stable environments. 
Further, empirical evidence suggests that mana-
gerial perceptions may vary across industry con-
texts (Keats and Hitt, 1988; Lant et al., 1992; Priem, 
1994; Snyder and Glueck, 1982; Sutcliffe and Huber, 
1998), which implies that industry context may in-
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fluence the cognition of top managers. However, 
the link between industry context and cognition of 
top managers has not been explicitly tested in a sys-
tematic way. 
One facet of industry context that has created 
much interest in both the academic and practitio-
ner-oriented literature on strategic management is 
industry velocity (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; 
Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Eisenhardt and Mar-
tin, 2000), variously referred to as industry cycle 
(Williams, 1994), and industry clockspeed (Fines, 
1998). Industry velocity reflects the speed (fre-
quency of changes and the time span of intervals 
between these changes) (Duncan, 1972; Jurkovich, 
1974; Tung, 1979) and unpredictability of changes 
in industry variables (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). High velocity indus-
tries are characterized by rapid and unpredictable 
changes in product and process technologies and 
competitors’ strategic actions that make it difficult 
for top managers of incumbent firms to develop a 
clear and comprehensive understanding of their en-
vironment. In contrast, the inherent stability of low 
velocity industries allows top managers in incum-
bent firms to gradually build and improve their un-
derstanding of the environment through systematic 
scanning approaches. Thus, high and low velocity 
industries pose different cognitive challenges to top 
managers in incumbent firms. 
We propose that the differences in cognitive 
challenges embedded in high and low velocity in-
dustries will lead to differences in the nature of in-
teractions and learning that top managers in in-
cumbent firms engage in and result in different 
forms of attention focus and causal logics held by 
top managers of firms in high and low velocity 
contexts. These differences in attention focus and 
causal logics will, in turn, affect how quickly they 
respond to major environmental changes. In other 
words, top managers’ attention focus and causal 
logics will act as filters and mediate the relation-
ship between industry velocity and speed of strate-
gic response. 
In this section, we integrate the managerial cog-
nition literature (Bogner and Barr, 2000; Daft and 
Weick, 1984; Dutton et al., 1983) and the industry ve-
locity literature (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Eisen-
hardt and Martin, 2000; Fines, 1998) to develop hy-
potheses that link industry velocity with attention 
focus and causal logics about environment. 
Industry velocity and attention focus 
Salience is what causes some environmental cues to 
draw more attention than others. Research on cog-
nition, including cognition in organizations, dem-
onstrates that the level of salience of any given so-
cial cue is linked to the degree to which it is novel 
in context, deviates from expectations, or is goal 
relevant (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Sutcliffe and Hu-
ber, 1998). Thus, elements of the operating environ-
ment that are expected to capture the attention of 
top managers are those that are unusual for the en-
vironment (e.g., a new competitor in an industry 
with high barriers to entry), that differ from man-
agerial expectations (e.g., an unanticipated drop in 
customer demand), or that are perceived as rele-
vant to the attainment of organizational goals (es-
pecially elements perceived as significant to orga-
nizational performance). Theoretical and empirical 
work in the strategy and organizations literatures 
make a similar argument—environmental sectors 
characterized by strong cues in the form of high 
levels of uncertainty (unusual for environment or 
different from expectation) (Daft et al., 1988; Dun-
can, 1972; Garg et al., 2003), and hostility (goal rel-
evance) (Daft and Weick, 1984) draw the attention 
of top managers. For example, Daft et al. (1988) 
found that when sector uncertainty was high, exec-
utives reported greater frequency of scanning (i.e., 
attention). 
We expect task sector to be less salient in low ve-
locity environments than in high velocity industries. 
This is because in low velocity task sectors, changes 
occur along roughly predictable and linear paths 
(Bogner and Barr, 2000; Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000). They have relatively stable industry structures 
such that market boundaries are clear and the play-
ers (e.g., suppliers, competitors, customers, comple-
menters) are well known and rarely change so top 
managers in incumbent firms rarely face task sector 
events that are unusual or unexpected. The top man-
agers of firms in low velocity industries also face rel-
atively less hostile task sectors because their firms 
can protect existing core competencies and achieve 
sustainable competitive advantage by building iso-
lating mechanisms that retard imitations (Garg et al., 
2003; Williams, 1994). 
In contrast to low velocity environments, the task 
sectors in high velocity environments are character-
ized by nonlinear and unpredictable changes (Bog-
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ner and Barr, 2000; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
In high velocity industries, market boundaries are 
blurred, successful business models are unclear, 
and market players (i.e., buyers, suppliers, compet-
itors, complementers) are ambiguous and shifting 
(D’Aveni, 1994). Top managers of firms in high ve-
locity environments also face high levels of com-
petitive hostility; building sustainable competitive 
advantage is difficult because firms cannot pro-
tect existing products and processes for a long time 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Fines, 1998; Williams, 
1994) and, therefore, firms cannot sustain above-av-
erage profits based on a single established innova-
tion or advantage. As top managers of firms in high 
velocity environments consistently address the fast 
changing, hostile, and unpredictable changes in 
the task sectors by introducing new products and/
or process technologies faster (Nerkar and Roberts, 
2004; Cottrell and Nault, 2004) and carry out fre-
quent strategic and organizational changes (Eisen-
hardt and Martin, 2000; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fines, 
1998), task sector cues are likely to dominate subjec-
tive representations of their operating environment. 
In sum the stronger salience of task sector in high 
velocity environments is likely to result in greater 
dominance of task sector concepts in subjective rep-
resentations of the environment, whereas the weaker 
salience of the task sector in low velocity environ-
ments will lead to lower levels of attention focus on 
task sector in managers’ subjective representations. 
We therefore expect that: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Industry velocity will positively 
affect top managers’ attention focus on the task 
sector. 
Due to the predictability and stability of the task sec-
tor in low velocity environments, top managers are 
likely to direct their attention to changes in general 
sector (such as recession, wars, regulatory, and po-
litical), which they may consider to be less predict-
able and linear. Thus, general sector is likely to cre-
ate greater levels of uncertainty and hostility than 
do changes in their task sector (Garg et al., 2003) and 
to motivate top managers to direct their time and 
effort toward scanning it. As these managers con-
sistently direct their scanning activities toward the 
general sector, they will, over time, develop an at-
tention focus bias toward it (Dearborn and Simon, 
1958; March and Simon, 1958). On the other hand, 
the general sector is likely to be less salient than the 
task sector for top managers of firms in high veloc-
ity environments due to the high level of uncertainty 
and change in the task sector. The weaker salience 
of the general sector is likely to lead top manag-
ers in high velocity environments to direct less at-
tention to it. In other words, all things being equal, 
the subjective representations top managers of firms 
in low velocity environments hold of their environ-
ments are likely to have direct greater attention fo-
cus on general sector than those of firms in high ve-
locity environments. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Industry velocity will negatively 
affect top managers’ attention focus on the general 
sector. 
Industry velocity and strategy-environment causal logic 
Daft and Weick (1984) suggest that the degree to 
which strategy-environment causal logics held by 
top managers are proactive (strategy → environ-
ment) or deterministic (environment → strategy) 
is at least partly a function of the nature of the in-
dustry itself. Of particular influence is the degree 
to which environments are predictable or analyz-
able in the form of well-defined trends in customer 
demands and clearly defined industry structures. 
Where “predictable uniformities in relationship 
among significant objects” exist and accurate fore-
casts are available, top managers view the environ-
ment as “analyzable” and develop strategies that fit 
their environment (Daft and Weick, 1984: 287). In 
environments where relationships are less predict-
able, top managers experience the environment as 
“unanalyzable” and seek “to construct, coerce, or 
enact a reasonable interpretation that makes previ-
ous action sensible and suggests some next steps” 
(Daft and Weick, 1984: 287). 
High velocity environments reflect rapid, frequent 
environmental change that continually disrupts the 
competitive structure of the industry (D’Aveni, 1994; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). Forecasts are not possible and sta-
tistical trends do not correlate with key strategy in-
dicators (Aguilar, 1967). Further, traditional anchors 
of sense-making such as well-defined competitors, 
established channels of distribution, and customer 
groups do not exist (Bogner and Barr, 2000). In these 
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industries, top managers actively seek to make sense 
of their environment by engaging in action and see-
ing what happens (Weick, 1995). They experiment, 
test, and probe (Eisenhardt, 1989). As top managers 
of these firms actively construct and enact their en-
vironments through experimentation and innova-
tive strategies, they are likely to develop proactive 
logics (strategy → environment). 
In contrast, low velocity environments are char-
acterized by linear and predictable changes (Eisen-
hardt and Martin, 2000; Fines, 1998; Williams, 
1994), which lend themselves well to learning about 
the nature of the environment and its relationship 
to firm behavior (Daft and Weick, 1984). Further, 
clearly established and well-defined industry and 
competitive structures in the form of competitors, 
channels of distribution, product markets, and so 
on exist and remain relatively invariant. Since un-
predictable changes in these industries are less fre-
quent, top managers of incumbent firms are likely 
to view the environment as analyzable and some-
thing that firms need to adjust to. Therefore, as top 
managers of firms in low velocity industries sys-
tematically analyze, learn from, and respond to 
their operating environments, they are likely to de-
velop more deterministic causal logics (environ-
ment → strategy). 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Industry velocity will positively 
affect the level of top managers’ proactive causal 
logics. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Industry velocity will negatively 
affect the level of top managers’ deterministic causal 
logics. 
The mediating role of attention focus and causal logics 
In this section, we propose that top managers’ at-
tention focus and causal logics will mediate the re-
lationship between environment and strategic ac-
tion outcomes. We also hypothesize the nature of 
the mediation. We use speed of strategic response as 
a strategic action outcome because its implications 
for firm survival and success make it an outcome of 
interest for strategy scholars. The strategy literature 
has consistently prescribed the importance of align-
ing firm strategies with opportunities and threats in 
the environment (Andrews, 1987; Ginsberg, 1988; 
Miles and Snow, 1972; Mintzberg, 1972; Porter, 
1985; Quinn, 1980; Hofer and Schendel, 1978). Fur-
ther, research has demonstrated that firms that ini-
tiate timely strategic responses to changes in the 
environment outperform those that delay in their 
response (Cotrell and Nault, 2004; Haveman, 1992; 
Nerkar and Roberts, 2004; Smith and Grimm, 1987; 
Baum and Wally, 2003). Studies have also shown 
that firms that fail to adjust in a timely fashion may 
enter a downward spiral from which they do not es-
cape (Cameron, Sutton, and Whetten, 1988; Ham-
brick and D’Aveni, 1988). 
Cognition studies have argued that the initia-
tion of speedy firm responses to environmental 
changes is tied to top managers’ interpretations 
of the environment (Barr and Huff, 1997; Bog-
ner and Barr, 2000; Chakravarthy, 1982; Daft and 
Weick, 1984; Lant et al., 1992; Simon, 1991; Weick, 
1995). Dutton and Duncan (1987) suggest that “... 
a major reason organizations respond differently 
to changes in the environment involves how stra-
tegic issues are triggered and interpreted by deci-
sion-makers” (Dutton and Duncan, 1987: 279). As 
cognitive limits preclude top managers from form-
ing complete and accurate understandings of their 
environment, it is top managers’ subjective cogni-
tive interpretations of the environment, rather than 
the objective nature of the environment itself, that 
determines which external events will be noticed 
and responded to. Raw signals from the environ-
ment are not addressed until firms notice these sig-
nals and interpret their causal relationship with 
the firm (Huff, 1990; Dutton et al., 1983). This sug-
gests that industry velocity will not have a direct 
effect on the speed of response. Rather, attention 
focus and causal logics will affect which environ-
mental events top managers notice, how they inter-
pret those events, and how quickly they respond 
to them. In other words, attention focus and causal 
logics will mediate the relationship between indus-
try velocity and the speed of response. Hypothesis 
5 (H5): Attention focus on the general sector will 
mediate the relationship between industry veloc-
ity and speed of response to changes in the general 
sector and the task sector. 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Attention focus on the task sec-
tor will mediate the relationship between industry ve-
locity and speed of response to changes in the general 
sector and the task sector. 
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Hypothesis 7 (H7): Proactive causal logics will me-
diate the relationship between industry velocity and 
speed of response to changes in the general sector 
and the task sector. 
Hypothesis 8 (H8): Deterministic causal logics will 
mediate the relationship between industry velocity 
and speed of response to changes in the general sec-
tor and the task sector. 
In what follows, we specify the nature of media-
tion of attention focus and causal logics. 
Attention focus 
Top managers are more likely to recognize and ac-
tively attend to environmental change that takes 
place in the sectors that are central to their subjective 
representations of the environment than to changes 
that occur in the sectors that are less central to their 
representations (Lant et al., 1992; Fiol and O’Connor, 
2003). When top managers fail to actively attend to 
environmental changes, they are unlikely to imple-
ment strategic responses (Huff and Schwenk, 1990; 
Terreberry, 1968). Further, top managers are likely 
to more quickly recognize, understand, and formu-
late responses to changes in the sectors to which 
they actively attend than to changes in sectors that 
are not central to their cognitive systems. Therefore, 
firms with top managers that have an attention fo-
cus on the general sector are more likely to quickly 
recognize and actively attend to changes in this sec-
tor than changes in the task sector. Conversely, top 
managers’ strong attention focus on task sector is 
likely to promote faster response to changes in the 
task sector. This suggests the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 9a (H9a): Top managers’ attention fo-
cus on the general sector will be positively related to 
speed of response to changes in the general sector. 
Hypothesis 9b (H9b): Top managers’ attention fo-
cus on the general sector will be negatively related to 
speed of response to changes in the task sector. 
Hypothesis 9c (H9c): Top managers’ attention focus 
on the task sector will be positively related to speed 
of response to changes in the task sector. 
Hypothesis 9d (H9d): Top managers’ attention focus 
on the task sector will be negatively related to speed 
of response to changes in the general sector. 
Environment-strategy causal logics 
Speed of response is also likely to be influenced by 
the type of causal logics top managers hold about 
the relationship between environment and firm be-
havior. Top managers with deterministic causal 
logics undertake action to realign the environ-
ment-strategy fit following a change in their task or 
general sectors. After the environmental change oc-
curs, top managers with deterministic causal logics 
will first try to understand what the events mean in 
terms of change in environmental demands so they 
can develop a proper “fit” response, and response 
will follow (Wooldridge and Floyd, 1989). Develop-
ing a comprehensive understanding of a specific en-
vironmental change requires extensive intelligence 
gathering and market surveillance activities (Daft 
and Weick, 1984; Wooldridge and Floyd, 1989), 
which requires significant time and resources. This 
emphasis on getting feedback from specific environ-
mental changes before undertaking response actions 
is therefore expected to decrease the speed of strate-
gic response to environmental changes in both the 
task sector and the general sector. 
Top managers with proactive causal logic do not 
undertake extensive efforts to understand their en-
vironments prior to undertaking a response. Top 
managers will undertake actions based on their 
own interpretations; sense-making processes about 
the event follow rather than precede action (Daft 
and Weick, 1984). Top managers with proactive 
causal logics experiment, test, and probe the envi-
ronment through action (Chakravarthy, 1982; Daft 
and Weick, 1984; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) and 
action outcomes provide feedback about the envi-
ronmental changes. This proactive and anticipatory 
adaptation will considerably increase the speed of 
strategic responses initiated by firms in high veloc-
ity industries. 
Hypothesis 10a (H10a): Top managers’ deterministic 
environment-strategy causal logics will be negatively 
related to speed of response to both the general sec-
tor and the task sector. 
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Hypothesis 10b (H10b): Top managers’ proactive en-
vironment-strategy causal logics will be positively re-
lated to speed of response to both the general sector 
and the task sector. 
Methods 
Choice of industries 
To test our hypotheses, we needed to identify indus-
tries that varied in velocity but were similar on other 
dimensions that could confound attention focus, 
causal logic, and speed of response. Accordingly, 
we selected industries using a two-step process: 
First, based on a thorough review of existing litera-
ture on industry velocity (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 
1988; Eisenhardt, 1989; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; 
D’Aveni, 1994; Fines, 1998; Judge and Miller, 1991; 
Mendelson and Pillai, 1999; Williams, 1994), we 
identified seven high velocity (personal computers, 
computer software, toys and games, athletic foot-
wear, semiconductors, movie, and cosmetics) and 
six low velocity (aircraft, furniture, steel, ship build-
ing, petrochemicals, and paper) industries. 
Second, we matched each high velocity industry 
with every low velocity industry on nine objective 
and four subjective industry attributes that could 
potentially confound our results. Objective mea-
sures included: capital intensity, R&D intensity, ad-
vertising intensity, total shipments, employment, 
exports, imports, industry concentration, and munif-
icence (Dess and Beard, 1984). We measured these 
variables using industry-level data from COMPUS-
TAT and U.S. Industry Outlook data published by 
U.S. Department of Commerce (1993). For subjec-
tive measures, we used the average ratings (based 
on a five-point Likert scale) of one industry analyst 
and two strategy professors (Kippendorf’s alpha = 
0.89) familiar with each industry on four industry 
attributes: knowledge intensity, manufacturing in-
tensity, complexity of supply chain, and technol-
ogy intensity (hi-tech versus low-tech) (Fines, 1998; 
Ghemawat and Rivkin, 1999). We computed the Eu-
clidean distances for each industry pair (high veloc-
ity-low velocity) and chose two pairs that had the 
minimum distance: semiconductor-aircraft and cos-
metic-petrochemicals. The use of four industries (two 
matched pairs) allowed us to isolate the impact of in-
dustry velocity on cognition and strategic response 
variables, while minimizing the confounding effects 
of differences across the four industries in industry 
attributes other than industry velocity. 
Time frame and sample selection 
We chose a 25-year period—1970 to 1994—for this 
study. Prior work indicates that 25 years is sufficient 
to capture the upturns and the downturns in the 
performance, growth, technologies, and global com-
petition of the four industries studied here (Bilstein, 
1996; Chapman, 1991; Estrin, 1984; Heppenheimer, 
1997). 
We used three criteria to select firms from the 
four industries (four-digit Standard Industrial Clas-
sification codes). First, strategy studies have stressed 
that it is important to select nondiversified firms in 
studies making cross-industry comparisons because 
the effects of industry characteristics (such as in-
dustry velocity) on cognition (Huff, 1982) and strat-
egy variables (Gupta, 1988; Rajagopalan and Datta, 
1996) can be more directly assessed for nondiversi-
fied firms. Hence, we restricted our sample to firms 
deriving at least 70 percent of their sales revenues 
(Rumelt, 1974) from their primary business for the 
entire time period of the study (1970–1994). Second, 
strategy studies have underscored that relation-
ships between industry characteristics and individ-
ual firm behavior are likely to be most pronounced 
for the large, principal firms in an industry (Rajago-
palan and Datta, 1996; Williamson, 1963). We used 
three measures of firm size used most frequently in 
previous literature to identify the largest firms in 
the four industries from 1970 to 1994—natural loga-
rithm of the number of employees in the firm (Dal-
ton and Kesner, 1983; Guthrie and Olian, 1991), to-
tal firm sales in dollars (Rajagopalan and Datta, 
1996), and market share (Porter, 1985). Third, vari-
ation in attention focus and causal logics and speed 
of response can result from maturation of firms 
rather than from variation in the industry velocity. 
This problem is more likely in younger rather than 
older firms (Baron and Bielby, 1980). Firms that are 
at least 10-years old are adequately mature (Baron 
and Bielby, 1980) and have well developed cogni-
tion (Barr, 1998), so we selected firms that were at 
least 10-years old. 
These diversification, size, and age measures 
yielded seven firms in the aircraft industry, seven 
firms in the semiconductor industry, five firms in 
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the petrochemical industry, and five firms in the 
cosmetic industry. Appendix I lists the sample firms 
and provides basic demographics on each. 
Data sources 
Measuring top managers’ cognition is a difficult 
task; cognitive structures cannot be measured di-
rectly and the very act of asking individuals to re-
veal their beliefs can change them. This is particu-
larly problematic when asking individuals to recall 
the beliefs they held in prior time periods because 
memories are often incomplete, misinterpreted, or 
mistakenly reported because of the outcomes later 
achieved (Bettman and Weitz, 1983). The retrospec-
tive bias inherent in interviews is particularly prob-
lematic in situations where individuals are asked to 
recall information from the distant past, as would be 
the case for the type of longitudinal design used in 
the present study (Golden 1992). 
Prior work has addressed these issues by utiliz-
ing written or verbal statements as indirect indica-
tors of top managers’ beliefs or subjective cognitive 
representations (Barr et al., 1992; Davis, Diekmann, 
and Tinsley, 1994; Fiol, 1994). Of particular rele-
vance to those interested in capturing the beliefs of 
the top management of an organization are Letters 
to Shareholders (LTS) in company annual reports. 
These letters are public statements made by chief ex-
ecutives charged with charting their companies’ fu-
tures and are official documents that discuss the stra-
tegic themes that top managers believe are important 
to the firm (Osborne et al., 2001). While these docu-
mentary sources can represent only espoused be-
liefs rather than the full complement of beliefs that 
are held, perhaps unconsciously (Fiske and Taylor, 
1991), by top managers, there is reason to believe that 
they reflect those beliefs that are at the forefront of 
their consciousness as they contemplate the issues of 
the time (Erdener and Dunn, 1990). Thus, these doc-
uments allow one to capture indicators of top man-
agers’ beliefs in use while avoiding the unintentional 
imposition of the researcher’s own beliefs about what 
concepts should be important. Researchers have used 
LTS to identify corporate strategies (Bowman, 1978; 
Miller et al., 1996), assess the causal reasoning of stra-
tegic decision makers (Barr et al., 1992; Bettman and 
Weitz, 1983; Fahey and Narayanan, 1989), examine 
how institutional changes are theorized (Greenwood, 
Suddaby, and Hinnings, 2002) and how changes in 
industry regulations are interpreted (Barr, 1998; Barr 
and Huff, 1997), and explain cognitive bases of joint 
venture activity (Fiol, 1989). 
A major criticism of the use of LTS is that they 
are written for specific audiences and thus may suf-
fer from attempts at impression management. Pre-
vious studies have found this self-serving bias to be 
most relevant to statements explaining firm perfor-
mance—managers attribute positive organizational 
outcomes to internal causes and negative outcomes 
to external causes (Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Staw, 
McKechnie, and Puffer, 1983; Salancik and Meindl, 
1984). However, more recent work suggests that 
these attribution patterns may represent biases in 
the sense-making process, not conscious attempts at 
impression management (Huff and Schwenk, 1990; 
Clapham and Schwenk, 1991). 
Comparisons between the framing in LTS and 
framing in internal documents have revealed that 
statements concerning non-evaluative issues such 
as control, internal/external orientation, and cus-
tomer orientation were highly consistent across in-
ternal and external sources (Fiol, 1995). Because our 
study is interested only in the relative focus of rep-
resentations on different environmental sectors and 
on the direction of the environment-strategy rela-
tionship, evaluative statements are irrelevant to the 
study and we excluded evaluative statements, which 
specify a clear positive (e.g., the economic boom has 
improved our financial position and given us a com-
petitive edge) or negative evaluation (e.g., the eco-
nomic downturn created a crisis for our firms) of a 
specific environmental event on firm outcomes. We 
focused instead on neutral and non-evaluative state-
ments that mentioned specific strategic actions that 
firms undertook to respond to environmental events 
(e.g., industry sales dropped by 15% … so we cut 
costs by 20% by closing down four factories and sell-
ing old machinery and equipment). As a result, we 
expect that statements in LTS give us a reasonable 
reflection of the espoused beliefs held by top man-
agers from our sample firms. To further assess the 
appropriateness of this data source, we conducted 
checks for consistency, trustworthiness, and time 
lag, as follows: 
Consistency 
It is possible that the role played by top managers 
in preparing LTS is limited and so what is reflected 
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there is not consistent with the beliefs held by those 
managers. However, informal conversations with 
executives (Barr et al., 1992) and systematic empir-
ical analyses (Fiol, 1994) suggest considerable top 
management involvement and accuracy in the prep-
aration of LTS. Clapham and Schwenk (1991) also 
suggest that LTS are closely scrutinized by finan-
cial analysts and are therefore too important to be 
ignored by top managers. Nevertheless, to check the 
consistency of the content of these documents, we 
compared their content to the management’s discus-
sion and analysis section of the 10-K forms for our 
sample firms over the entire study period. Consid-
ered to be a good validation source because their 
contents are believed to have high reliability (Glueck 
and Willis, 1972), 10-K forms are not created as 
means of public communication but rather are writ-
ten to fulfill Security and Exchange Commission fil-
ing requirements. In our analysis, the percentage of 
common concepts between LTS and management’s 
discussion ranged from 60 percent to 77 percent 
(semiconductor industry: mean = 68%, S.D. = 12%; 
aircraft industry: mean = 71%, S.D. = 15%; cosmetic 
industry: mean = 74%, S.D. = 10%; petrochemical 
industry: 67%, S.D. = 15%), suggesting satisfactory 
consistency in content between the two documents 
(Carley and Palmquist, 1992). We also found high 
correlations (ranging from 0.47, p < 0.05 to 0.74, p < 
0.0001) between the frequencies of concepts appear-
ing in the LTS and in management’s analysis, sug-
gesting consistency in the relative emphasis given to 
different concepts across the two documents (Carley 
and Palmquist, 1992). 
Trustworthiness of information 
We asked two industry analysts to rate each of 
the 24 sampled companies for the level of trust-
worthiness of information disclosed in the LTS on 
a five-point scale (1 = highly untrustworthy and 5 
= highly trustworthy) for five different time peri-
ods (1970–1975, 1975–1980, 1980–1995, 1985–1990, 
1990–1994). The analysts were asked to focus on 
misrepresentation of facts as well as framing of 
the information. None of the 24 sampled firms re-
ceived a rating of “untrustworthy” or “highly un-
trustworthy” for the period of our study. The mean 
of the trustworthiness ratings was 3.9 and the stan-
dard deviation was 0.90. 
Time lags 
Expression in an LTS may lag considerably behind 
an actual strategic action. To check for such lags, 
we collected announcements of 15 specific events 
(e.g., mergers, acquisitions, divestiture) made by 
the firms in The Wall Street Journal (1970–1994) and 
then matched the date of an announcement with 
the mention of the same event in the LTS. A time 
lag existed if the event was not reported in the LTS 
for the same year as the event was announced in 
The Wall Street Journal. None of the firms had time 
lags for more than 15 percent of the events in the 25 
years. Thus, time lag was not an issue for the cur-
rent sample. 
Constructing causal maps 
To measure attention focus and causal logics of top 
managers, we first elicited top managements’ causal 
maps of their environments from annual reports. 
The causal mapping technique is a form of content 
analysis that isolates causal assertions within a docu-
ment (Axelrod, 1976). Use of causal mapping is con-
sistent with the assertion that causal reasoning is the 
primary way in which strategic decisions are devel-
oped and understood (Barr et al., 1992; Huff, 1990). 
As noted earlier, content analysis of archival doc-
uments is especially useful in our study because it 
avoids the recall bias that plagues interviews (Axel-
rod, 1976) especially when, as in this case, the study 
covers longitudinal time frames. Moreover, causal 
mapping provides detailed, rigorously collected in-
formation about cognitive structures that is not typi-
cally found in case studies (Barr, 1998). 
Following Axelrod (1976), we developed causal 
maps from the LTS in a four-step procedure illus-
trated in Appendix II. In the first step, two raters 
(not authors) familiar with the area of strategic man-
agement independently identified statements that 
clearly contained a cause-effect relationship between 
environment and strategy variables from the LTS 
using key words such as “if-then,” “because,” “so,” 
“as.” We did not provide any formal definitions of 
“environment” and “strategy” to the raters to min-
imize intrusiveness in eliciting raw phrases (Barr et 
al., 1992; Fahey and Narayanan, 1989). We assessed 
their interrater reliability using Kendall’s coefficient 
of concordance (W = 0.88). 
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In the second step, raw causal maps were created. 
This process involves deciding which part of the text 
to code, and what words to use in the coding scheme. 
To identify which part of the text to code, the same 
two raters separated the causal statements identi-
fied in the first step into “causes” and “effects” to 
build the “raw causal maps.” Carley and Palmquist 
(1992) argue that aggregation reduces misclassifi-
cation of concepts due to peculiar wording by indi-
viduals, so to decide what words to use in the cod-
ing scheme, three experienced coders (not authors 
or original coders) independently coded the origi-
nal cause and effect phrases in the LTS identified by 
the two raters into 48 common “raw environmental 
concepts” and 59 “raw strategy concepts” (W = 0.91) 
that were close in meaning to the original phrases in 
the annual reports. To avoid coder bias, text distor-
tion and comparative incongruence, the coders used 
the rule “denotation rather than interpretation.” We 
used the “majority rule” to resolve disagreements 
between the coders (Carley and Palmquist, 1992). 
We also consulted industry and strategy experts to 
ensure the 107 raw concepts were distinctive and at 
the same level of abstraction. 
In the third step, we used existing theoretical 
frameworks to organize the 107 raw concepts into 
broad conceptual categories representing environ-
ment and strategy. Generalization of similar con-
cepts using theoretical frameworks enables re-
searchers to set up a common basis to compare 
causal maps across diverse topical contexts (e.g., 
high and low velocity industries) and increases the 
relevance and validity of the emergent concepts by 
ensuring that the categories are distinct and uniform 
in breadth and abstraction (Carley and Palmquist, 
1992; Fahey and Narayanan, 1989). 
To categorize environmental concepts, we used 
extant frameworks of the general and task sectors 
(Bourgeois, 1980; Daft et al., 1988; Garg et al., 2003). 
We classified concepts relating to macroeconomic 
(e.g., domestic recession, global recession, interna-
tional currency exchange rates, and Asian financial 
crises), political (e.g., change in political adminis-
tration, change in government policies, changes in 
world trade organization policies, European Union 
charter, and international U.S. relations), and regu-
latory variables (e.g., environmental laws relating 
to reduction in noise and pollution levels) under 
the general sector. We grouped concepts relating to 
competition (e.g., imitators, new entrants, decline in 
barriers to entry, global competition, cooperative al-
liances of competitors), supplier (e.g., scarcity of raw 
materials, supplier dominance, diversity of suppli-
ers), customer (e.g., market fragmentation, growth 
of specific markets, convergence of markets, shifts 
in customer demand), and technology (e.g., product 
innovation, diffusion of technological know-how, 
technological transitions) under the task sector. We 
show our coding list in Appendix III. 
Organizational strategy consists of both content 
(the “what” of strategy) and process (the “how” 
of strategy) and we sought to include indicators of 
both in this study. We used prominent strategy con-
tent (Porter, 1985; Rumelt, 1974) and process (Mint-
zberg, 1972; Reger and Huff, 1993) frameworks to 
comprehensively categorize firm strategies men-
tioned in the LTS. We used Porter’s (1985) content-
based framework to organize corporate strategy 
concepts and the competitive action classification 
(Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier, Smith, and Grimm, 1999) to 
organize competitive strategies. We used a variety 
of sources including popular text books (Hitt, Ire-
land, and Hoskisson, 2004), classic books (Hofer and 
Schendel, 1978), and process related review (Reger 
and Huff, 1993) and empirical (Mintzberg, 1972) pa-
pers to develop a comprehensive classification of 
strategy process concepts. 
We validated these environmental and strategy 
categories using the sorting technique suggested by 
Anderson and Gerbing (1991). Three strategy pro-
fessors and four industry analysts classified the 48 
environmental concepts into general and task sec-
tor categories and the 59 strategy concepts into strat-
egy content and process categories (W = 0.89). We 
used the majority rule in categorizing concepts for 
which the agreement was not 100 percent (Carley 
and Palmquist, 1992) and utilized only those con-
cepts agreed to by four or more raters. 
For illustrative purposes, Figure 2 shows parts of 
the causal maps of a firm in low velocity industry 
and a firm in high velocity industry. 
Measures
Industry velocity 
Industry velocity comprises both rate (speed) and 
volatility (unpredictability) of changes in industry 
variables (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Brown 
and Eisenhardt, 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000). We used three established and 
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validated measures of rate of industry change: num-
ber of new products introduced, time span (num-
ber of years) between new products introduced, 
and depreciation rates of capital equipment (coef-
ficient alpha = 0.92) (Fines, 1998; Katila and Ahuja, 
2002; Martin and Mitchell, 1998; Mendelson and Pil-
lai, 1999; Nerkar and Roberts, 2004). We used trade 
and industry-specific journals and manufacturer’s 
catalogs to gather information on the number and 
number of years between new product introduc-
tions. Consistent with previous studies on indus-
try velocity (Fines, 1998; Mendelson and Pillai, 1999) 
and new product introductions (Katila and Ahuja, 
2002; Martin and Mitchell, 1998; Nerkar and Rob-
erts, 2004), we focused on individual products in-
troduced rather than categories of new products in-
troduced. We computed the average depreciation 
rates for each industry based on the 10-K forms of 
incumbent firms in the industry. The results of Wil-
coxon1 sign rank tests confirmed that both semicon-
ductor and cosmetic industries had higher numbers 
of new product introductions, shorter spans of inter-
vals between new product introductions, and lower 
Figure 2. Illustration of parts of the causal maps of a firm in low velocity industry and a firm in high velocity 
industry 
1 The semiconductor industry had higher velocity than the air-
craft (new product introductions: Z = 4.53, p < 0.001; span of 
intervals: Z = 5.95, p < 0.001; depreciation rates: Z = 3.89, p 
< 0.001); and the petrochemical (new product introductions: 
Z = 5.28, p < 0.001; span of intervals: Z = 5.31, p < 0.001) in-
dustries. The cosmetic industry also had higher velocity 
than the aircraft industry (new product introductions: Z = 
4.15, p < 0.001; span of intervals: Z = 4.79, p < 0.001; depre-
ciation rates: Z = 3.59, p < 0.01). Differences in rate of indus-
try change measures of the semiconductor and cosmetic, and 
the aircraft and petrochemical industries not significant. 
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depreciation rates of capital equipment than air-
craft and petrochemical industries for the years 
1970 to 1994. 
We measured volatility using a variation of the 
environmental volatility measure developed by 
Dess and Beard (1984). We calculated volatility by 
regressing a variable for each year on a variable for 
net industry sales (Bergh and Lawless, 1998). We 
ran 25 different equations in each industry to esti-
mate volatility for each of the 25 years (1970–1994). 
For example, we used net industry sales from 1965 
to 1970 to predict volatility in 1970 and so on. Fol-
lowing the equation yt = b0 + b1t + at, where y is in-
dustry sales, t is year, and a is the residual, volatility 
was the standard error of the regression slope coeffi-
cient divided by average sales. Larger values of vol-
atility point to greater environmental unpredictabil-
ity (Bergh and Lawless, 1998; Dess and Beard, 1984). 
The results of Wilcoxon sign rank tests2 confirmed 
that both the semiconductor and cosmetic industries 
were more volatile than aircraft and petrochemical 
industries. 
The rate and volatility measures were highly cor-
related (ranging from 0.64 to 0.88). Therefore, we 
created a composite measure of industry veloc-
ity by averaging the z-scores of rate and volatility 
measures. We measured the industry velocity mea-
sures (t) in the year preceding the year in which we 
measured the attention focus and causal logic vari-
ables (t + 1). 
Environmental events 
We identified major events in the general and task 
sectors of the aircraft, petrochemical, semiconduc-
tor, and cosmetic industries (Bourgeois, 1980; Daft et 
al., 1988; Garg et al., 2003). Table 1 shows the num-
ber of events identified in the general and task sec-
tors for each industry. For the general sector, we 
triangulated industry histories (Bilstein, 1996; Chap-
man, 1991; Estrin, 1984; Heppenheimer, 1997), trade 
journals and reports (U.S. trade outlook, 1994, 2000), 
and interviews with industry consultants to identify 
major events in the macroeconomic (e.g., domestic 
recession in 1990, Asian financial crisis in 1997), po-
litical (e.g., Persian Gulf War in 1991, and changes in 
bilateral trade agreements between the United States 
and Japan in 1985 and 1988), and regulatory (e.g., 
deadlines for completion of phase I and II of reduc-
tion in noise and pollution emission levels for air-
crafts, upgrading of material standards for the cos-
metic industry) arenas of the four industries. 
We identified major events in the task sectors of 
the four industries based on indicators of changes 
in competitive, customer demand, and technol-
ogy variables. We used changes in five indica-
tors to identify changes in competition: capital inten-
sity, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, value of 
imports, and value of exports. A major decrease in 
capital intensity, R&D intensity, and advertising 
intensity implies that barriers to entry decline sig-
nificantly, thereby resulting in significant increase in 
new entrants and competition and/or a major shift 
2 The semiconductor industry had significantly higher volatil-
ity than the aircraft (Z = 3.78, p < 0.001) and the petrochemi-
cal (Z = 4.25, p < 0.001) industries. The cosmetic industry also 
had significantly higher unpredictability than the aircraft (Z 
= 3.25, p < 0.001) and the petrochemical (Z = 4.21, p < 0.001) 
industries. Differences in the unpredictability of the semi-
conductor and cosmetic, and the aircraft and petrochemical 
industries were not significant. 
Table 1. Major events in the general sectors of the four industries: 1970 to 1994 
Environmental sector        Type of change                                                    Number of changes 
                                                                                        Aircraft          Semiconductor       Petrochemical          Cosmetic 
                                                                                        industry               industry                 industry                 industry 
General sector  
 Macroeconomic  3  3 3  3 
 Political 3  2 2  2 
 Regulatory 1 2  3 3 
     Total changes 7  7 8  8 
Task sector 
 Customers  1 2  1  2 
 Competitive 2  4  2  4 
 Technological  1  5  2  4 
      Total changes 4  11 5  10
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in competition (Hill and Hansen, 1991). The value of 
imports and exports represents the degree of global 
competition in an industry; a major change in ei-
ther variable suggests a significant shift in the scope 
of competition (Hambrick and Lei, 1985). We mea-
sured shifts in demand through significant changes in 
industry sales (value of total shipments) (Dess and 
Beard, 1984). Significant increase or decline in in-
dustry growth rate represents major shifts in indus-
try munificence. 
We used an auto correlation function (ACF) plot 
to identify significant changes in the five compe-
tition variables and in changes in industry sales 
(Eye, 1990). An ACF represents correlations of a se-
ries with lagged values of itself. It is especially use-
ful in diagnosing outliers or unpredictable values 
in the time series. Yearly changes in which the stan-
dard error values were outside of the 95 percent 
confidence interval as assessed by the auto correla-
tion function (ACF) were identified as major com-
petitive changes. 
Technology changes are also an integral part of 
a firm’s task sector (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; 
Tushman and Romanelli, 1994). We used Tush-
man and Anderson’s (1986) definition to identify 
technological shifts—end of an era of convergence 
and emergence of new technologies that either sig-
nificantly improve or completely replace exist-
ing technologies. A review of industry analysis re-
ports by the U.S. Department of Commerce (1994, 
1997) (U.S. Industrial Outlook, 1994, U.S. Industry 
& Trade Outlook, 1997) and history books (Bilstein, 
1996; Chapman, 1991; Estrin, 1984; Heppenheimer, 
1997) on the four industries led us to identify one 
technological shift in the aircraft industry (1994–
1995: introduction of the revolutionary high-speed 
civil transport); five shifts in the semiconductor in-
dustry (1983–1984: dynamic random access mem-
ory (DRAM) technology; 1986–1987: focus on 
non-DRAM technologies; 1989–1990: erasable pro-
grammable memory chips (EPROM) technology; 
1993–1994: convergence of computing and com-
munications technologies creating mobile comput-
ing and personal conferencing products; and 1997–
1998: introduction of “hybrid applications” such as 
multimedia applications) (Goldstein and Aspray, 
1997; U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993 [Indus-
trial Outlook, 1993: chap. 15]); four shifts in the 
cosmetic industry (1975–1977: automated cosmetic 
manufacturing technologies; 1980–1982: shift from 
metal to laminated plastic packaging technology; 
1985–1987: introduction of synthetic base materi-
als; 1992–1994: animal testing alternative technolo-
gies); and two shifts in the petrochemical industry 
(1974–1976: plate tectonic and jet drilling technolo-
gies; 1992–1994: basin simulation, 3D seismic and 
tertiary recovery technologies). 
We validated the technology shifts in each indus-
try using one industry analyst and two professors 
specialized in corresponding industry research. We 
provided the experts with a list of individual prod-
uct and process innovations in the industry and 
asked that they classify them into major and minor 
innovations from 1970 to 1994. The “major” innova-
tions identified by the experts matched the technol-
ogy shifts identified through archival sources. 
Attention focus 
We measured attention focus by the network-based 
measures of centrality of the concepts in the LTS. 
Centrality reflects the degree to which a concept 
dominates the causal relationships in a cause map; 
the greater the centrality of a concept, the greater 
the attention focus around that concept in the map 
(Carley and Palmquist, 1992; Eden et al., 1992; Knoke 
and Kuklinski, 1982). We used two network-based 
measures of centrality—degree (how well connected 
a given concept is within a network) and closeness 
(how close a given concept is to other concepts in 
the network). We computed centrality measures us-
ing the Netanalysis software (Fahey and Narayanan, 
1989; Nadkarni and Narayanan, 2005), which uses 
standard social network algorithms (Borgatti, 2005; 
Freeman, 1978/1979; Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982). 
Degree centrality focuses only on direct or adja-
cent paths of a concept with other concepts in the 
network. Degree centrality is computed as (Borgatti, 
2005; Freeman, 1978/1979; Scott, 2000): 
where: 
CD(Pk) = number of concepts connected to 
concept k 
a(pi, pk) = connection from pi to pk (either 0 or 1) 
n = number of concepts in the causal map 
The closeness centrality is obtained by using the 
shortest paths from the focal concept to reach all 
1410 S.  Na d k a r N i  & P.S.  Ba r r i N St r a t e g i c  Ma n a g e M e n t Jo u r n a l  29 (2008) 
other concepts in the network as follows (Freeman, 
1978/1979; Nieminen, 1974): 
where: 
CD(Pk) = number of concepts connected to 
concept k 
d(pi, pk) = distances: shortest number of paths 
that concept pi has to go through to reach 
each concept in the network 
n = number of concepts in the causal map 
Appendix IV illustrates the degree and close-
ness centrality measures for a causal map compris-
ing four concepts (A, B, C, and D). Concept C is the 
most central concept in the network based on de-
gree (1.0) as well as closeness (1.0) centrality because 
it is most connected and has the shortest distance 
to other concepts in the network. Following previ-
ous studies, we represented centrality of the task 
or general sector by the centrality score of the most 
central concept in each environmental sector (Car-
ley and Palmquist, 1992; Eden et al., 1992; Knoke 
and Kuklinski, 1982). Because the degree and close-
ness measures of centrality were highly correlated, 
we created a composite measure of centrality by av-
eraging the Z scores of the two measures. We gath-
ered centrality observations from the LTS for each 
year from 1970 to 1994. We lagged the centrality (t 
+ 1) measures a year behind the industry velocity (t) 
measures. 
Proactive and deterministic environment-strategy logics 
The managerial cognition literature has defined de-
terministic logics as environment → strategy links 
in the causal maps and proactive logics as strategy 
→ environment links in the causal maps (Eden et 
al., 1992; Fahey and Narayanan, 1989). Accordingly, 
we used in-degree and out-degree analysis (Bou-
gon, Weick and Binkhorst, 1977; Eden et al., 1992; 
Ford and Hegarty, 1983; Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982) 
of the causal links between environment and strat-
egy in the causal maps to measure levels of proac-
tive and deterministic causal logic. In-degree refers 
to the number of direct and indirect causal links go-
ing into a concept and is indicative of the degree 
to which the concept is contingent on a variety of 
factors influencing it. It is computed as (Freeman, 
1978/1979; Scott, 2000): 
where: 
CDI(Pk) = number of concepts going into concept 
k 
DI(pi, pk) = distances: shortest number of paths 
through which concepts in the network 
go into concept pk 
n = number of concepts in the causal map 
A high number of in-degrees for strategy con-
cepts would suggest that firms consider strategy as 
primarily an effect of, or response to, environmen-
tal concepts in the map representing a determinis-
tic causal logic. Appendix IV shows that concepts 
C and D have high in-degrees, whereas concepts A 
and B have zero in-degrees. 
For our study, high number of in-degrees for en-
vironmental concepts would suggest that strategies 
influence the environment and thus represents pro-
active causal logic, whereas the in-degrees for strat-
egy concepts would suggest that environment affects 
strategies, suggesting a deterministic causal logic. 
Out-degree refers to the number of links going 
out of a concept and is indicative of the degree to 
which a concept influences other concepts in the 
frame. Out-degree is computed as follows (Freeman, 
1978/1979; Scott, 2000): 
where: 
CDO(Pk) = number of concepts coming out of 
concept k 
DO(pi, pk) = distances: shortest number of paths 
through which concept pk goes into other 
concepts in the map 
n = number of concepts in the causal map 
Concepts with high out-degree are primarily 
causal or influential variables that pose contingen-
cies to other concepts in the map. In Appendix IV, 
concepts A and B have high out-degrees, whereas D 
has no out-degrees. 
For our context, high out-degrees for environ-
mental concepts suggest that firms perceive the en-
vironment as a contingency or a given, implying a 
deterministic causal logic. On the other hand, high 
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out-degrees for strategy concepts suggest that strat-
egies can influence the environment and are not 
merely responses to it. This indicates proactive 
causal logic. 
Capturing in-degree and out-degree based on the 
number of causal links does not capture the relative 
importance of the links in the frame. We used the 
proportion of proactive (number of strategy → en-
vironment links/total links in the causal map) and 
deterministic (environment → strategy links/to-
tal links in the causal map) causal links to identify 
the relative importance of these links (Carley and 
Palmquist, 1992; Knoke and Kuklinsky, 1982). 
To assess the dimensionality and distinctness of 
proactive and deterministic thinking, we conducted 
an exploratory factor analysis of the six measures of 
proactive and deterministic thinking with varimax 
rotation. As expected, the factor analyses yielded 
two distinct factors: proactive (eigenvalue: 3.25, 
variance 0.45) and deterministic (eigenvalue: 2.48, 
variance 0.36) causal logics. The in-degree of envi-
ronment (0.87), out-degree of strategy (0.91), and 
percentage of strategy → environment links (0.95) 
loaded highly on factor-1, which we call proactive 
causal logic, and had very low loadings on factor-
2, which we call deterministic causal logic (ranging 
from 0.29 to 0.68). Similarly, out-degree of environ-
ment (0.93), in-degree of strategy (0.89), and percent-
age of environment → strategy links (0.88) had high 
loadings on deterministic causal logic and low load-
ings on proactive causal logic (ranging from 0.33 to 
0.54). To avoid problems of multicolinearity in our 
mediated regression analysis (Achen, 1982), we de-
veloped composite measure of proactive causal 
logic by averaging the z-scores of in-degree of envi-
ronment, out-degree of strategy, and percentage of 
strategy → environment links. Similarly, we created 
a composite measure of deterministic logic by av-
eraging the z-scores of out-degree of environment, 
in-degree of strategy, and percentage of environ-
ment → strategy links. We gathered the proactive 
and deterministic logic observations for each year 
from 1970 to 1994. We lagged the causal logic vari-
ables (t + 1) by a year behind the industry velocity 
(t) measures. 
Speed of strategic responses 
Previous studies that examine the relationship be-
tween environmental beliefs and strategic responses 
contend that it is important to specify a priori the ac-
tions that could be considered as responses to spe-
cific environmental factors (Barr, 1998; Barr and 
Huff, 1997). To identify firm responses to the envi-
ronmental events identified earlier, we first listed 
the strategic actions that were identified in a myr-
iad of secondary sources including 10-K reports, 
U.S. Department of Commerce Industry Outlook re-
ports, announcements in The Wall Street Journal, and 
published histories of the four industries (Bilstein, 
1996; Chapman, 1991; Estrin, 1984; Heppenheimer, 
1997) as firm responses to each change in the gen-
eral and task sectors. There was a high degree of 
agreement across the document resources in the ac-
tions identified as strategic response (W = 0.85). We 
further validated the responses yielded by the sec-
ondary sources through consultations with indus-
try analysts. Two industry analysts familiar with 
each industry were provided with a list contain-
ing the events and the strategic responses derived 
from secondary sources and asked to select the ac-
tions that they considered were responses to each 
specific event. There was a high degree of conver-
gence between two industry analysts for each in-
dustry (semiconductor industry: W = 0.79, aircraft 
industry: W = 0.85, petrochemical industry: W = 
0.82, cosmetic industry: W = 0.77). Disagreements 
were resolved through follow-up interviews with 
each consultant. 
Speed of strategic response was measured as the 
number of days between the occurrence of an event 
and the initiation of the first strategic response. The 
fewer the number of days between the occurrence 
of the environmental event and the initiation of the 
strategic response, the faster the speed of response. 
To ascertain the approximate date when each sam-
pled firm initiated the first strategic response ac-
tion, we content analyzed articles pertaining to each 
of the responses for the sampled firms in the F&S 
Predicast database. This comprehensive source con-
sists of news article titles and abstracts from over 700 
newspapers, business magazines, trade association 
publications, and business newsletters published in 
the United States (Ferrier, 2001). Most of these arti-
cles consistently specified the exact date of the initi-
ation of the response (day, month, year). To allow us 
to make causal inferences, we measured the atten-
tion focus and causal logic variables in the year pre-
ceding the year in which we measured speed of stra-
tegic response. 
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Controls 
We controlled for five industry variables that may 
affect environmental beliefs as well as strategic re-
sponses—industry munificence, industry con-
centration, capital intensity, R&D intensity, and 
advertising intensity. Industry growth or munifi-
cence—measured as yearly percentage change in in-
dustry gross sales (Dess and Beard, 1984)—reduces 
the motivation to direct attention to new environ-
mental areas, and engage in aggressive strategic and 
competitive behavior (Ferrier, 2001). Slow growth 
often causes more intense competition and lower 
profitability that motivates paying attention to new 
environmental areas and engaging in proactive stra-
tegic actions (Porter, 1985). High industry concen-
tration (measured as the ratio of sales for the in-
dustry’s top four companies to total industry sales) 
limits competitive actions among firms by creating 
high barriers to entry and yields higher profits to es-
tablished firms (Porter, 1985). This limits environ-
mental beliefs and strategic responses to actions that 
leverage existing competencies. High capital inten-
sity (capital expenditures divided by sales) requires 
firms to invest heavily in long-term assets, which 
fosters persistence in environmental beliefs and stra-
tegic responses (Dess and Beard, 1984). High R&D 
(R&D expenditures divided by sales) and advertis-
ing intensity (advertising expenditures divided by 
sales) encourages innovation and product differen-
tiation that drive proactive search for new ideas and 
new ways of doing things (Rajagopalan and Datta, 
1996). We measured these variables in the years pre-
ceding the attention focus and causal logic variables 
using industry-level data from COMPUSTAT and 
U.S. Industry Outlook data published by the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce. 
We controlled for two firm-level variables3—sales 
growth and past performance changes. Previous 
cognition-related studies have consistently identi-
fied the crucial role of both sales growth rates and 
past performance changes in explaining variations 
in managerial cognition (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1996; Weick, 1995; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). Firm 
sales growth was defined as the percent change in 
the total company sales in the three years preced-
ing the attention focus and causal logic variables ad-
justed for inflation (Guthrie and Olian, 1991; Rajago-
palan and Datta, 1996). For example, for causal logic 
variables in 1970, we measured sales growth from 
1967 to 1970. 
Drawing on a procedure suggested by Venkatra-
man and Ramanujam (1987), we created a compos-
ite measure of past performance change by averag-
ing yearly changes in the values of three financial 
measures—return on sales, return on equity, and 
return on assets. We conducted sensitivity analy-
sis using one, two, and three-year changes in per-
formance variables. The results from two and three 
year changes in past performance variables did not 
differ from the results yielded by yearly changes. 
Therefore we used yearly changes in performance 
preceding the attention focus and causal logic vari-
ables. We collected the performance data from an-
nual COMPUSTAT tapes. 
Analyses and Results 
Analyses 
Tests of mediated models in the management liter-
ature have been dominated by Baron and Kenny’s 
(1986) causal steps approach, but this approach has 
been criticized for several shortcomings, including 
low power to detect effects and high Type I error 
rates. To overcome these problems, recent studies 
have proposed bootstrapping procedures for esti-
mating indirect effects of the criterion variables on 
the outcome variables through the proposed media-
tors (see MacKinnon et al., 2002; Shrout and Bolger, 
2002). Bootstrapping is a nonparametric approach to 
hypothesis testing that, unlike other methods testing 
mediation (e.g., Sobel test), imposes no assumptions 
about the shapes of the distributions of the variables 
or the sampling distribution of the statistic. In the 
bootstrapping method, the significance of the indi-
rect paths from the independent variable (industry 
velocity) to the dependent variables (speed of stra-
tegic responses) through the mediators (attention fo-
cus and causal logic variables) is explicitly estimated 
by a product coefficient that is a product of the path 
coefficient from independent to mediator variables 
3 We ran the regressions using three additional firm controls—
size (sales and number of employees), age, and diversifica-
tion. We also reran the regressions using 23 dummy (0, 1) 
variables to control for between-firm differences. However, 
because none of these variables had any significant effects in 
any regressions, we did not include them in the final analy-
sis. Excluding these nonsignificant control variables allowed 
us more degrees of freedom in our analysis. 
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and the path coefficient from mediator to the depen-
dent variable. 
We used time series cross-sectional (TSCS) regres-
sion analysis to estimate the coefficients of the paths 
from independent to mediator and from mediator to 
the dependent variables using 25 years of data for 
the 24 sampled firms. We then used these coefficients 
in the bootstrapping method to estimate the signif-
icance of the indirect paths from industry velocity 
to speed of strategic response through attention fo-
cus and causal logic variables. The use of multiple 
time periods enhances the reliability of the estimates 
of the regression parameters (Greene, 1992). The hy-
pothesized relationships between the study variables 
were modeled as separate equations as follows: 
Yit = β′xit + εit,   (i = 1, …, N; t = 1, …, T). 
In the first equation, Xit are the control and indepen-
dent (industry velocity) variables of industry i in the 
year t and Yit are the mediator variables (attention fo-
cus and causal logics) of firm i in year t +1 (N = 600 
firm-years). In the second set of equations, Xit are the 
control and independent (industry velocity) vari-
ables of industry i in the year t and Yit are the depen-
dent variables (speed of strategic response to gen-
eral events: N = 178 firm-years, speed of strategic 
response to task sector changes: N = 185 firm-years) 
of firm i in the year t +2 (following the mediator vari-
ables). In the final equation, Xit are the control, inde-
pendent (industry velocity), and mediator variables 
and Yit are the dependent variable (speed of strategic 
response to general events: N =178 firm-years, speed 
of strategic response to task sector changes: N = 185 
firm-years) of firm i in the year t +2. In the final equa-
tion, we first entered controls, followed by mediators 
(attention focus and causal logics) and finally, the in-
dependent variable (industry velocity). 
Our data represents TSCS data of 24 firms for 25 
years. Efficient and unbiased regression estimation 
of such TSCS data consisting of long periods for a 
few firms may depend on correction for some prob-
lems. We estimated generalized least squares regres-
sion models using the LIMDEP software (Greene, 
1992) with the TSCS estimator, which corrects for 
the following problems: 
• groupwise heteroskedasticity, E[e^2(i,t)] = sii, 
• cross group correlation, Cov[e(i,t),e(j,t)] = sij, 
• within group autocorrelation, e(i,t) = rie(i,t – 1) 
+ u(i,t) 
The TSCS estimator provides consistent estimates 
in the presence of groupwise heteroskedasticity, and 
cross-and within-group correlation. The model and 
the procedures used are those described in Greene 
(1992) and LIMDEP version 7. We checked for mul-
ticolinearity in the models by examining the vari-
ance inflation factors for each independent variable. 
None of the variables were above the recommended 
values of 10 (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 1985), 
suggesting that multicolinearity was not a major 
threat in the regression analysis. 
Results 
The descriptives and intercorrelations among study 
variables are shown in Table 2. 
The results of the TSCS mediator regression anal-
ysis of the impact of industry velocity (indepen-
dent variable) on top managers’ attention focus and 
causal logics (mediators) are shown in Table 3. Of 
the controls, R&D intensity has a positive relation-
ship with proactive causal logic (B = 0.22, p < 0.05), a 
weak negative relationship with deterministic logic 
(B = –0.09, p < 0.10), and no relationship with atten-
tion focus. Past performance change has a positive 
relationship with proactive causal logic (B = 0.24, p 
< 0.001) and a negative relationship with determin-
istic causal logic (B = –0.21, p < 0.001). The other con-
trols have either a weak relationship (p < 0.10) or no 
relationship with the mediator variables. 
Industry velocity has a positive relationship with 
top managers’ attention focus on the task sector (B 
= 0.51, p < 0.001) and a negative relationship with 
attention focus on the general sector (B = –0.32, p < 
0.001). These results support Hypotheses 1 and 2. In-
dustry velocity has a positive relationship with pro-
active causal logic (B = 0.34, p < 0.001) and a nega-
tive relationship with deterministic causal logic (B = 
–0.39, p < 0.001), supporting Hypotheses 3 and 4. 
The results of the bootstrapping mediated re-
gression analyses are shown in Table 4. The 95 per-
cent confidence intervals are based on bootstrap es-
timations with 10,000 replications. Recall that speed 
of response is measured as the number of days be-
tween the occurrence of the event and initiation of a 
response, and therefore has a reverse implication—
the fewer the number of days, the faster the speed 
of response. The total effects of industry velocity on 
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speed of response to general sector changes (B = –
0.24, p < 0.001; 95% CI = 0.029, 0.181) as well as on 
speed of response to task sector changes (B = –0.15, 
p < 0.001; 95% CI = 0.019, 0.197) are significant. The 
indirect effects of industry velocity on speed of re-
sponse to general sector changes through attention 
focus on general sector (B = –0.25, p < 0.001; 95% 
CI = 0.051, 0.189), attention focus on task sector (B 
= –0.17, p < 0.001; 95% CI = 0.017, 0.125), proactive 
logic (B = –0.41, p < 0.001; 95% CI = 0.062, 0.171), 
and deterministic logic (B = –0.29, p < 0.001; 95% CI 
= 0.045, 0.289) are all significant. Similarly, the indi-
rect effects of industry velocity on speed of response 
to task sector changes through attention focus on 
general sector (B = –0.35, p < 0.001; 95% CI = 0.064, 
0.358), attention focus on task sector (B = –0.22, 
Table 2. Means, standard deviations, and correlation matrix of high and low industries 
Variable                                      Descriptives                                       Intercorrelations among study variables 
 Mean  SD  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
1. Sales growth    — 
2. Past performance Δ    0.25* —
3. Environment sectors1  — — 0.11 0.09 —
4. Industry velocity  — — 0.32* 0.27* 0.29* —
5. Attention focus: general  0.27 0.01 0.12 0.25* –0.31* –0.39*** —
     sector3         
6. Attention focus: task  0.05 0.02 0.21 0.22† 0.28* 0.45*** –0.23*   —
    sector4           
7. Proactive causal logics  0.19 0.07 0.13 0.24* 0.18† 0.41*** –0.18* 0.24* —
8. Deterministic causal logics  0.21 0.10 0.25† –0.27* –0.21† –0.38*** 0.22* –0.21* –0.32** —  
9. Speed of strategic  25.19 10.08 0.13 0.10 0.05 0.21† –0.10 0.18† 0.20† –0.12 —
     responses  
† p < 0.10;  * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Environment sectors: general sector = 0, task sector = 1 
Table 3. TSCS regression results of the effect of industry velocity (independent variable) on attention focus and causal logics 
(mediator variables) 
Independent variable                 Proactive logic             Deterministic logic             Attention focus            Attention focus on 
                                                            (n = 600)                           (n = 600)                          on task sector                 general sector 
                                                                                                                                                    (n = 600)                         (n = 600) 
                                                          B                SE B                B                SE B                 B                SE B                B                SE B 
Controls 
Industry controls:  
Capital intensity  0.14 0.11 0.19 0.14 0.22† 0.10 0.11 0.05
R&D intensity  0.22* 0.07 –0.09† 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.12
Advertising intensity  0.15† 0.04 –0.17† 0.03 0.18 0.11 0.14 0.12
Industry concentration  –0.09† 0.02 0.27† 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.24 0.19
Industry munificence  –0.18† 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.11
Firm controls1:         
Sales growth  0.12† 0.04 0.25† 0.12 0.21† 0.07 0.14 0.17
Past performance Δ 0.24* 0.09 –0.21* 0.07 0.12† 0.05 0.11 0.08
     ΔR2  0.11   0.14  0.09  0.07 
Industry velocity  0.34*** 0.05 –0.39*** 0.04 0.51*** 0.07 –0.32*** 0.04
     ΔR2  0.17***  0.21***  0.24***  0.19*** 
TSCS regression results of the effect of industry velocity (independent variable) on attention focus and causal logics (media-
tor variables) 
† p < 0.10;  * p < 0.05;  ** p < 0.01;  *** p < 0.001 
1 We created 23 dummy variables to control for firm differences. The results presented in the table are after controlling for 
the firm dummy variables
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p < 0.001; 95% CI = 0.091, 0.314), proactive logic (B 
= –0.15, p < 0.001; 95% CI = 0.051, 0.326), and deter-
ministic logic (B = –0.29, p < 0.001; 95% CI = 0.153, 
0.294) are also significant. Moreover, the direct ef-
fects of industry velocity (after entering the medi-
ators) on both speed of response to general sector 
Table 4. Results of bootstrapping mediation regression analysis for the relationships between industry velocity, attention 
focus, causal logics, and speed of strategic response 
Independent and mediator                              Speed of response to general                            Speed of response to task 
variables                                                                          sector changes                                                   sector changes 
                                                                         B             S EB                  95% CI                  B             S EB                    95% CI 
Total effects      
   Industry velocity  –0.24***  0.03  0.029, 0.181  –0.15***  0.02  0.019, 0.197 
Direct effects 
   Industry velocity  –0.17  0.22  –0.037, 0.156  –0.09  0.11  –0.007, 0.054 
Indirect effects 
   Attention focus 
      Attention focus on general sector  –0.25**  0.03  0.051, 0.189  –0.35**  0.07  0.064, 0.358 
      Attention focus on task sector  –0.17***  0.02  0.017, 0.125  –0.22***  0.03  0.091, 0.314 
   Causal logics 
   Proactive logics  –0.41***  0.05  0.062, 0.171  –0.15***  0.02  0.051, 0.326 
   Deterministic logics  –0.29***  0.03  0.045, 0.289  –0.25***  0.03  0.153, 0.294 
** p < 0.01;  *** p < 0.001
Table 5. TSCS regression results of attention focus and causal logics (mediators) and speed of response (dependent 
variable) 
                                                                                             Controls                                                      Mediators 
                                                                            Speed of                  Speed of                    Speed of                      Speed of 
                                                                         response to               response to               response to                 response to 
                                                                      general events1           task events1            general events1             task events1 
                                                                           (n = 178)                    (n = 180)                    (n = 178)                      (n = 180) 
                                                                         B            SE B            B              SE B            B             SE B             B             S EB 
Controls: 
Capital intensity  0.14†  0.05  0.22†  0.09  0.04  0.05  0.02  0.05 
R&D intensity  –0.09†  0.04  –0.05*  0.01  –0.17  0.14  –0.11  0.15 
Advertising intensity  –0.11†  0.05  –0.07  0.09  –0.10  0.06  –0.08  0.12 
Industry concentration  0.02  0.01  0.14†  0.06  0.05  0.09  0.11  0.06 
Industry munificence  0.17  0.12  0.09  0.05  0.12  0.15  0.10  0.13 
Firm sales growth  0.22*  0.04  0.18*  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.01  0.00 
Past performance Δ  0.14*  0.02  0.24*  0.07  0.09  0.12  0.03  0.07 
ΔR2  0.09†   0.12†   0.05   0.04 
Independent variable:
Industry velocity      –0.07  0.04  –0.10  0.07
ΔR2      0.06†   0.05 
Mediating variables: 
Proactive logic      –0.24***  0.03  –0.19***  0.02 
Deterministic logic      0.15***  0.02  0.05***  0.00 
Attention focus on general sector      –0.03***  0.00  0.07***  0.00 
Attention focus on task sector      0.17***  0.02  –0.20***  0.03 
ΔR2      0.21***   0.17*** 
1 Speed of response variables have a reverse interpretation—the fewer the number of days between occurrence of general 
and task events and the initiation of strategic responses, the higher the speed of response and vice versa. 
† p < 0.10;  * p < 0.05;  ** p < 0.01;  *** p < 0.001 
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changes (B =0.17, n.s.; 95% CI = –0.037, 0.156) and 
speed of response to task sector changes (B = 0.09, 
p < 0.001; 95% CI = –0.007, 0.054) are nonsignificant. 
This suggests that attention focus and causal logic 
variables completely mediate the relationships be-
tween industry velocity and speed of response to 
general and task sector changes and support Hy-
potheses 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
To understand the nature of mediation, we esti-
mated the impact of attention focus and causal logic 
variables on speed of responses. These results are 
shown in Table 5. 
Attention focus on the general sector has a posi-
tive relationship (negative coefficient: B = –0.03, p < 
0.001) with speed of response to general events, and 
a negative relationship (positive coefficient: B = 0.07, 
p < 0.001) with speed of response to task events, pro-
viding support for Hypotheses 9a and 9b, respec-
tively. In contrast, attention focus on the task sector 
has a positive coefficient (B = 0.17, p < 0.001), imply-
ing a negative relationship with speed of response 
to general events and a negative correlation (B = –
0.20, p < 0.001), suggesting a positive relationship 
with speed of response to task events, which sup-
ports Hypotheses 9c and 9d, respectively. Together, 
the block of attention focus and causal logic vari-
ables explains significant incremental variance in 
speed of response to general (ΔR2 = 0.21, p < 0.001) 
and task (ΔR2 = 0.17, p < 0.001) events. 
Proactive logic has a negative coefficient, suggest-
ing a positive relationship to speed of response to 
both general (B = –0.24, p < 0.001) and task (B = –
0.19, p < 0.001) events. These results lend support to 
Hypothesis 10a. In contrast, deterministic logic has a 
positive correlation, suggesting a negative relation-
ship with speed of response to general (B = 0.15, p 
< 0.001) and task (B = 0.05, p < 0.001) events. Thus, 
Hypothesis 10b is supported. 
Discussion 
In this study we sought to unite the economic and 
cognitive views of strategic action into a more inte-
grated view that takes into account the influence of 
each. We developed and tested a mediated model 
in which environment is proposed to influence ac-
tion through the cognitive frameworks held by top 
managers. Our results confirm the mediating role of 
managerial cognition—industry velocity influenced 
attention focus and causal logics, which in turn, in-
fluence speed of strategic response to major changes 
in the general and task sectors of the environment. 
Specifically, industry velocity positively influenced 
top managers’ attention focus on task sector and 
negatively influenced attention focus on general sec-
tor. Similarly, industry velocity has a positive rela-
tionship with proactive causal logics (strategy → 
environment) and a negative relationship with de-
terministic causal logics (environment → strategy). 
Further, attention focus and causal logics fully me-
diated the relationship between velocity and speed 
of firm response to major changes in the task and 
general sectors. These findings have important im-
plications for our understanding of the development 
of top managers’ beliefs, the relationship between 
those beliefs and strategic action, and bring us closer 
to understanding the complex relationship between 
industry context, managerial cognition, and strate-
gic action. 
Limitations 
Our results highlight intriguing relationships be-
tween environment, managerial cognition, and orga-
nizational response to environmental events. How-
ever, before discussing the implications of these 
results, it is appropriate to discuss the limitations 
inherent in the research design that affect their in-
terpretation. First, the use of LTS and concentration 
on attention focus on external environment and en-
vironment-strategy assumptions of firms provide a 
relatively restricted perspective on managerial cog-
nition. Our focus on a specific type of managerial 
cognition was motivated by our desire to study the 
cognition for which there was an existing theoretical 
basis for expecting a link to environment. Our use of 
annual reports follows from the longitudinal design 
of the study, which required similar sources of top 
management team (TMT) beliefs for 26 firms across 
four industries over a 25-year period. For such stud-
ies, archival data is most feasible and annual re-
ports have been shown to be an acceptable source 
of managerial beliefs in prior research (Barr et al., 
1992; Fiol, 1994). Nevertheless, future study of the 
links between environment, cognition, and action 
may wish to focus on other types of beliefs (e.g., ac-
tion scripts, categorization, attention focus on inter-
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nal organizations, etc.) derived from other types of 
sources (e.g., internal documents, longitudinal sur-
vey techniques). 
Interpretation of our results is also limited by the 
usual concerns about generalizability. We focused 
on the largest and least diversified firms from four 
well-established industries. Thus, we can extend our 
results only to large firms from industries with sim-
ilar characteristics. Future work that investigates 
the links between environmental context, manage-
rial cognition, and action that focuses on different 
industry contexts (e.g., emerging industries, declin-
ing industries, service industries), different types of 
firms (e.g., small or midsized), and different aspects 
of cognitive representations would provide useful 
tests of the generalizability of our results. 
Implications
Mediating role of managerial cognition 
In revealing relationships between industry veloc-
ity, managerial cognition variables, and speed of 
strategic action, our study represents an initial step 
in addressing the disconnect between the industry 
structure (Bain, 1956; Mason, 1957; Porter, 1985) and 
managerial cognition views (Barr et al., 1992; Bog-
ner and Barr, 2000; Fiol and O’Connor, 2003; Sut-
cliffe and Huber, 1998) of strategic actions. This is 
especially important for the industry velocity con-
text. Empirical studies in this area have revealed dif-
ferences in the strategic behaviors of firms in high 
and low velocity environments, but have ignored 
the role of managerial cognition in driving these be-
haviors (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997; D’Aveni 1994; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Wil-
liams, 1994). Our results extend this research by sug-
gesting that industry velocity affects the attention 
focus and causal logics that top managers develop 
about their environments, which, in turn, drive the 
speed of strategic actions. This pattern is consistent 
with the cognitive explanation of strategic actions, 
which suggests that incumbent firms enact their en-
vironments. However, contrary to prior empirical 
research on cognition, which only assumes or im-
plies a link between environment and cognition, 
these results highlight how industry context influ-
ences managerial cognition. Our results provide ex-
plicit evidence that industry forces significantly and 
directly influence the cognition process by shaping 
the attention focus and causal logics that manag-
ers use to make sense of and act within the environ-
ment. Thus, both industry and cognition variables 
are critical in developing a comprehensive explana-
tion of strategic action. 
The need to take an integrative perspective to the 
two views of strategic action was raised by Johnson 
and Hoopes (2003) in their simulation study. How-
ever our results differ from theirs in an important 
way. They found that cognition gains prominence 
under conditions of costly search and relatively low 
competitive pressures, whereas the role of cognition 
is insignificant when competitive pressures increase 
and costs of search are lower. Our results reveal an 
influence of cognition on strategic action in both high 
velocity industries—characterized by strong com-
petitive pressures and low costs associated with ex-
perimentation and search (Bogner and Barr, 2000; 
D’Aveni, 1994)—and low velocity industries, char-
acterized by relatively low competitive pressures 
in which costs associated with experimentation and 
proactive search for new strategies are high (D’Aveni, 
1994; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). The differences 
in the results between our study and that of John-
son and Hoopes (2003) can be attributed to two fac-
tors. First, while Johnson and Hoopes (2003) focus 
on collective cognition—clusters of shared cognition 
among groups of firms in an industry, we focus on spe-
cific cognitive structures (attention focus and causal 
logics related to the environment) espoused by top 
managers from individual firms in different industry 
contexts. The results of inquiries into shared cogni-
tion may not apply to specific facets of cognition such 
as attention focus and causal logics of top managers 
in individual firms in an industry. Second, whereas 
Johnson and Hoopes (2003) used simulation proce-
dures to test propositions on cognition and industry 
structure, we used a field study approach to exam-
ine our model. The differences in the empirical ap-
proaches may also have contributed to the deviation 
in results. In the end, however, both studies point to 
the importance of both industry structure and cogni-
tion in directing firm action. 
Industry context and managerial cognition 
Our finding for a direct link between industry veloc-
ity and attention focus has implications for the de-
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veloping literature on attention (Ocasio, 1997; Hoff-
man and Ocasio, 2001). While prior research has 
proposed that attention is influenced by organiza-
tional processes, resources, and performance (Oca-
sio, 1997; March and Shapira, 1992), the results of the 
present study suggests that industry significantly in-
fluences attention focus. This is consistent with Oca-
sio’s principle of situated attention, which suggests 
that attention is context specific. However, Ocasio 
focused primarily on firm-level context, whereas the 
present study suggests that industry-level context is 
also important. Additional research to investigate 
the relative influence of industry- and firm-based 
contexts, as well as the interaction between the two, 
would appear to be warranted. 
The prominent role of cognition as well as the dif-
ferences in the type of cognition in high and low ve-
locity industries demonstrated in this study raises 
the interesting possibility that industry velocity is 
perpetuated by the beliefs of the TMTs enacting it, 
which contrasts with most extant literature on in-
dustry velocity. This possibility was raised theoret-
ically by Bogner and Barr (2000) and the pattern of 
results found in the present study is consistent with 
their arguments. Not only did firms in low veloc-
ity industries have a more deterministic perspec-
tive than firms in high velocity environments, they 
took longer to respond to changes in the task sec-
tor than the general sector. Firms in high velocity in-
dustries, on the other hand, had very proactive be-
liefs and responded faster to task sector changes, 
intensifying the speed of competition in high veloc-
ity industries. As industry velocity represents the 
aggregate actions of incumbent firms (Bogner and 
Barr, 2000; Fines, 1998), differences in strategic ac-
tions of incumbent firms driven by differences in at-
tention focus and causal logic may shape the indus-
try velocity. 
Finally, we believe this study is the first to ex-
plicitly test for links between industry context and 
managerial cognition. While much of the cognition 
literature implicitly assumes that cognitive frame-
works reflect the unique demands of different in-
dustry types, much of the work focuses on levels of 
cognitive similarity and difference within industries 
(Barr et al., 1992; Sutcliffe and Huber, 1998; Porac et 
al., 1995). There is limited empirical evidence of dif-
ferences in managerial cognitions across industries 
(Lant et al., 1992; Sutcliffe and Huber, 1998), but em-
pirical study focused on identifying systematic dif-
ferences in managers’ subjective representations of 
environment across different industry contexts has 
been lacking. The results of this study provide ini-
tial confirmation of relationships that are central to 
managerial cognition research. 
Managerial cognition and strategic action 
Our results indicate strong linkages between the at-
tention focus and causal logics developed by top 
managers and speed of strategic response to envi-
ronmental events. Where strategic decision makers’ 
attention is focused—on task sectors or on general 
sectors—affects the speed with which firms respond 
to events that occur within those sectors; response 
is faster to those events that occur within the sec-
tors on which the frames are focused. Speed of re-
sponse is also influenced by beliefs regarding the 
causal logic linking firm strategy (actions) and envi-
ronment; deterministic logics (environment → strat-
egy) are associated with slower responses than pro-
active logics (strategy → environment). 
Taken together, these results contribute to our 
understanding about the relationship between man-
agerial cognition and strategic response to environ-
mental events. Prior research has linked managerial 
cognition to the speed and content of organizational 
response to environmental events (Barr and Huff, 
1997; Barr et al., 1992; Dutton and Jackson, 1987; 
Thomas et al., 1993; Walsh, 1995), but this research 
has focused primarily on beliefs related to the issue 
or event itself (e.g., a specific regulatory change, a 
specific new technology introduced in the industry). 
Results of these works suggest, for example, that re-
sponse is linked to the degree to which the event is 
perceived as an opportunity or threat (Dutton and 
Jackson, 1987; Thomas et al., 1993) or as having di-
rect negative consequences for firm utility (Barr and 
Huff, 1997). The results of the present study suggest 
that patterns of managers’ subjective beliefs about 
the environment in general, and the relationship of 
these beliefs to strategic action, may influence speed 
of response independent from any specific beliefs 
that may be held about the event itself. This raises 
questions concerning the relative influence of be-
liefs about industry context (e.g., industry velocity) 
and beliefs about specific environmental events (e.g., 
a specific regulatory change, a specific new technol-
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ogy) on the speed of strategic response to environ-
mental events. It also extends prior research in spec-
ifying the “boundary conditions” that define the 
relationship between beliefs of strategic decision 
makers and speed of response. Future studies may 
want to build on the results yielded by this study to 
develop additional boundary conditions for the re-
lationship between beliefs and speed of response. 
Industry context and strategic action 
Another interesting question raised by these results 
concerns the validity of the prescriptive notion that 
principal or dominant firms respond quickly and 
decisively to environmental events. Our study sug-
gests that firms within a given context are slower to 
respond to some environmental events than to oth-
ers. In high velocity industries, firms responded 
more quickly to changes occurring in their task 
sectors, while firms in low velocity industries re-
sponded more quickly to events in their general sec-
tor. All of our firms were principal in their industry 
and strong performers, so this result may mean that 
a faster response is not always the best, or it may 
mean that the notion of “fast” is relative. Because we 
did not include smaller or poorer performing firms 
in this study, we cannot determine which interpre-
tation is more correct. But this does present an inter-
esting opportunity for future research. 
Conclusion 
The results of this study suggest that the timing of 
strategic response to major environmental events 
varies across industry context and that this vari-
ation is tied to beliefs and sense-making processes 
that vary by industry context. The findings contrib-
ute to a more complete understanding of the link-
ages between environmental context, beliefs, and 
firm action and bring us a step closer to reconciling 
economic and cognitive explanations for strategic 
action. 
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Appendix I. Demographic Summary of Sampled Firms 
Company                                           Mean sales $ (1970–1994)            Market share               Mean number of 
                                                                           in millions                                 (%)                   employees (1970–1994) 
Aircraft industry 
 1. Boeing  12602.88  23.94  104,700 
 2. McDonnell Douglas  8966.74  17.87  86,919 
 3. Lockheed Martin  7788.36  16.06  77,588 
 4. Raytheon  5654.73  11.50  65,521 
 5. General Dynamics  5106.50  11.47  76,099 
 6. Northrop Corporation  3337.85  6.30  33,094 
 7. Grumann Aerospace Corporation  2249.748  5.31  27,717 
Petrochemical industry 
 1. Dow Chemicals  21120.74  22.85  54,108 
 2. Dupont  27648.16  26.89  133,963 
 3. Sherwin-Williams  2877.85  6.12  18,783 
 4. PPG Industries  4826.76  9.15  36,034 
 5. Ashland  6629.63  8.89  30,883 
Semiconductor industry 
 1. Intel  2775.47  21.35  33,748 
 2. Advanced Micro Devices  783.24  8.48  13,067 
 3. National Semiconductors  1157.1  8.91  35,701 
 4. Texas Instruments  3077.14  23.67  89,874 
 5. LSI Logic  489.45  4.99  9,567 
 6. Vishay Intertechnology  346.04  3.69  8,926 
 7. Analog Devices  354.18  3.89  8,521 
Cosmetic industry 
 1. Revlon  2909.32  23.84  36,533 
 2. Avon  2547.90  17.59  30,731 
 3. Colgate-Palmolive  4565.45  31.89  38,100 
 4. Helene Curtis  851.79  7.51  3,918 
 5. Carter Wallace  564.54  5.72  3,271 
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Appendix II. An Illustration of the Five-Step Procedure of Constructing Causal Maps 
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General Sector 
1. Macroeconomic environment: 
• Change in government administration 
• Change in government policies 
• Recession in the United States 
• Global recession 
• Asian financial crises 
2. Political environment: 
• Persian-Gulf War 
• International U.S. relations 
• Political conflicts and hostilities 
• Economic conditions 
• Asian financial crisis 
3. Regulatory environment: 
• Changes in domestic regulations 
• Changes in regulations in other countries 
• Changes in World Trade Organization (WTO) 
regulations
Task Sector 
1. Customer/market environment: 
• Diversity of market segments 
• Growth of specific markets 
• Evolving customer demand 
• Diverse customer needs within a segment 
• Market fragmentation 
• Market convergence 
• Emerging market segments 
• Shifts in buyer demographics 
• Emerging buyer preferences 
2. Competitive environment: 
• Industry concentration 
• Importance of brand name 
• Ease of exit 
• Profit margins 
• Resource requirements 
• Cost disadvantages independent of size 
• Access to distribution channels 
• Imitators 
• Increased competition from alternative producers 
• Cooperative alliances of competitors 
• Market saturation 
• Global competition 
• Decline in barriers to entry 
• New entrants 
• Closeness of substitute products 
• Prices of substitute products 
• Performance of substitute products 
5. Technological environment: 
• Access to technology and know-how 
• Intellectual property rights 
• Product innovation 
• Technological change 
• Market innovation 
• Diffusion of technological know-how 
6. Suppliers 
• Scarcity of raw materials 
• Supplier dominance 
• Diversity of suppliers 
Strategy Content 
1. Corporate strategy 
• Acquisition 
• Merger 
• Cooperative ties with international firms 
• Cooperative agreement with domestic firms 
• Joint venture 
• Cooperative ties with suppliers 
• Turnaround strategy 
• Consolidation 
• Divestiture/sale of business units 
• Business focus versus diversification 
• Allocation of resources 
• Expansion of product lines 
• Nontraditional expansion opportunities 
2. Competitive strategy 
• Product customization 
• On time product deliveries 
• Enhanced customer service 
• New product introduction 
• Product development 
• R&D expenditures 
• Adapt to new technologies 
• Fast introduction of products 
• Product technology focus 
• Dealer incentives 
• Alliances with dealers 
• Advertising 
• New channels of distribution 
• Brand promotion 
• Expansion of marketing programs 
• Minimum tooling 
• Lower inventory levels 
• Product delivery on time 
• Lower production cost 
• Powerful suppliers 
• Economies of scale 
• Increase productivity 
Appendix III. Theoretical Categories Used to Code Raw Environmental and Strategy Concepts in the Causal Maps 
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• Lower waste 
• Production rates 
• Expansion/reduction of manufacturing capacity 
• Computerized manufacturing 
• New equipment and facilities 
• Capital expenditures 
• Increased outsourcing 
• Reallocation of existing capacity 
Strategy Process 
3. Organizational structure 
• Simplify organizational structures 
• Decentralize 
• Develop flexible structures 
• Delete layers of management 
4. People
• Stock incentive programs 
• Down-size 
• Select, promote, and train employees 
• Labor negotiations 
5. Business processes 
• Simplify business processes 
• Promote understanding of long-term objectives 
• Improve resource use 
6. Strategic controls 
• Develop communication systems 
• Strengthen control and procedural systems 
• Improve reporting systems 
• Budget 
Appendix IV. Illustration of Centrality, In-Degree and Out-Degree Measures in a Causal Map 
